Howdy, all, and Happy New Year!
When I have no paying work to do, most of my day is spent doing research on personal projects. Along the way, as I gather information, I’m reminded of things that lurk in the far back corners of my mind. Recently, I made an anniversary post on Facebook for the selection of the A-10 as the winner of the A-X competition, and as I dug, an interesting aspect of the program was brought back to mind, a smaller part of a larger theme, so to speak: the influence, either directly or indirectly, that Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had on almost every tactical aircraft used by the U.S. military from 1961 onward. Don’t believe me?
First, it was McNamara who pushed the USAF to adopt the Navy’s F4H-1/F-4B Phantom II made by McDonnell (later McDonnell Douglas). McNamara was a statistician, and was obsessed with the costs of the various military programs in work when he was tapped to serve as John F. Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense. Formerly the President of the Ford Motor Company, he had degrees in economics and an MBA. He was one of the so-called “Whiz Kids” Kennedy brought into his Cabinet. So, to McNamara, when the Air Force was looking for a modern fighter bomber, the fact that the Navy had an airplane he believed was suitable was enough for him.
As it turned out, the F-4 was a good fit with the USAF. Since the F-4 was originally designed as an attack airplane (the McDonnell AH-1), it was large enough to carry a fairly large ordnance load. Since it was overseen by the Navy, the airplane possessed all those aspects of Naval aircraft—small, light enough to operate from a flight deck, good low-speed and high-speed performance, etc.—that made it work aboard the carriers. With minimal changes, it was good for the Air Force, too. In essence, it was what both services needed at the time. Combat in Southeast Asia would eventually reveal shortcomings, but they were addressed as they became evident.
However, McNamara got lucky. His next move wouldn’t be so good…
The Navy had been looking to add a new Fleet Air Defense (FAD) airplane to their inventory in the 1950’s. They required an airplane with a powerful search and tracking radar that was fast and fairly maneuverable. Given the state of aviation—especially Naval aviation—in the 1950’s, such an airplane was not in the cards. The Navy decided, then, to have a subsonic aircraft that had enough range to fly out from the fleet and loiter, using the radar to locate potential threats and long-range guided missiles to shoot the enemy aircraft out of the sky. The program resulted in the proposed Douglas F6D Missileer, an aircraft similar in appearance to an enlarged F3D Skyknight, equipped with a Westinghouse AN/APQ-81 pulse-Doppler radar and carrying six Bendix AAM-N-10 Eagle missiles. The program did not progress, the Kennedy administration cut funding for the missile and the Navy eventually lost interest in the concept—but not in a fleet defense aircraft.
Enter TFX, the Tactical Fighter, Experimental program. The Air Force was looking for a new high-speed, low-level, all-weather interdiction/strike aircraft, and had issued General Operations Specifications for such an airplane. McNamara believed the Navy could use the same basic airplane for their FAD needs, too—their mission had changed from the Missileer concept to a high-speed maneuverable airplane with a search/track radar system similar to that proposed by the Missilee and the Air Force’s cancelled North American XF-108 Rapier interceptor program. Indeed, a lot of the technology proposed for the F6D and XF-108 did wind up in the TFX program—the Pratt and Whitney TF30 turbofan engine from the Missileer was modified with an afterburner, the Hughes AN/ASG-18 radar from the XF-108 was developed into the AN/AWG-9 system, and the AAM-N-11 was improved and became the AAM-N-11, later AIM-54 Phoenix, missile.
The difference between the successful integration of the F-4 into the Air Force and the development of a single airplane intended to accomplish the disparate missions TFX was supposed to undertake was that the TFX program was initiated by and administered by the Air Force, who tended to place their preferences ahead of those of the Navy. Anybody who has studied aviation for even a little while knows that the Navy’s requirements are much more stringent that anyone else’s—the airframe needs to be beefier, lighter, and smaller in order to operate off the carrier decks. Other factors came into play, too. The strike fighter didn’t need a large radar array in the nose, but the FAD did. The size of the radar was reduced, but it was still rather large for the USAF’s liking. In turn, the reduced size of the array reduced the effective range of the set, which didn’t please the Navy. In short, it should have come as no surprise that the resulting TFX variant (the F-111B) for the Navy was unsuitable for carrier duty—the basic design wouldn’t allow it.
McNamara, now fully obsessed with the concept of “commonality”, had heavily invested himself in TFX, which became apparent when he unilaterally overruled the selection committee (who chose Boeing’s design) and named General Dynamics’ design the winner based solely on the “commonality” factor—Boeing’s designs were 20% common while General Dynamics was closer to 85% common—and cost. He believed Boeing misestimated the cost aspects of their design. When the program ran into trouble early on, he burrowed himself deeper into it, at one time suggesting that he should be the program manager. Because he was schooled on flow charts and statistics and not aerodynamics and tactics, he missed the bigger point—this design was not, and would never be, suitable for both roles. In effect, the Navy toiled for nearly a decade before they were able to extract themselves from the TFX program in late 1968.
In the end, the results of the TFX program resulted in no airplanes for the Navy, and a compromised, less capable airplane for the Air Force. It also resulted in a very expensive program that yielded five subtypes for the USAF—the F-111A, F-111D, F-111E, F-111F, and the strategic FB-111A (that was produced to replace the Convair B-58 Hustler, which McNamara ordered the USAF to retire in 1965); and the F-111C for the Royal Australian Air Force. Each of these subtypes was different enough from the others to be less than 15% common across the fleet. Flaws pointed out early in the program took time and resources to rectify, and rather that looking at them as a fleet-wide issue, they were addressed differently on each subtype—each had slightly different inlets, and the avionics systems varied widely between each type. At the end of the day, the airplane the USAF received could have been so much better had it not had to make concessions for the Navy’s F-111B.
Now, some of this wasn’t directly McNamara’s fault. The F-111 would be the first production aircraft employing a variable geometry wing, and the first to be powered by an afterburning turbofan engine. Electronics technology, too, had been rapidly changing, so what worked one week was obsolete the next. That’s a lot of new stuff to be placed in one package, and problems cropped up during development. And, had he left the Air Force to develop TFX and allowed the Navy to pursue their FAD in a separate program, perhaps the results would have been different. Without having to deal with not only the gestational issues and the inter-service requirements, who knows what would have come to pass.
Once the Navy was allowed to develop their airplane, they did succeed. Grumman, the Navy’s contractor in the TFX program, developed their Model 303, and after they got out from under TFX, the airplane (the VFAX, later VFX, program) was developed into the F-14A Tomcat, the airplane the Navy wanted all along—more or less. It could have been in service much earlier had Grumman not been saddled by TFX. Grumman skipped the prototype phase (no XF- or YF-14’s were built), the first examples serving as full scale development (FSD) airframes. Several aspects of the Missileer and TFX were held over and used on the F-14, those being a variable geometry wing, TF30 engines, AN/AWG-9, and Phoenix missile armament. The radar and missile became the key parts of the Tomcat program, but the engines would plague the Tomcat throughout its life span. Eventually, the F-14A+ (later F-14B) and F-14D received new powerplants late in the type’s service life, but for the most part, they soldiered on with the TF-30.
Incidentally, the Pratt and Whitney TF30, the bane of both the F-111 and F-14, also powered the early version of the A-7 (albeit without an afterburner)—it wasn’t until the Air Force was told to adopt the A-7 that the engine was replaced with the Allison TF41, a license built copy of the Rolls-Royce Spey.
Those are the well-know items McNamara was responsible for. But there are more…
The USAF found out a hard, cold fact in the Vietnam War—their pointy-nosed, fast, and sexy jets were no good for close air support. In an effort to field an airplane better suited to protecting troops in contact and fly cover for rescue missions, they were more or less obliged to refurbish Douglas A-1 Skyraiders that the Navy had retired. Because these airplanes had already been declared obsolescent, the USAF went looking for a better solution. McNamara wanted them to adopt either the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk or the Vought A-7 Corsair II, both in service with the Navy. They weren’t happy—they had already had their arms twisted into operating the F-4 (which had some deficiencies that came to light in combat, notably the lack of an internal gun), they had adopted the Skyraider, and they really didn’t want another Navy airplane forced down their throats.
The USAF wanted a light attack airplane that was speedier that the A-1, A-4, or A-7 (they still hadn’t learned the lesson that speed wasn’t the end-all and be-all in the CAS mission), and could defend itself. They began looking at the Northrop F-5 as a solution, but McNamara, with more than a little pressure from the Army (whom the Air Force forbade from fielding a fixed-wing CAS airplane of their own and only grudgingly allowed them to develop attack helicopters), told the Air Force to choose—the A-4, the A-7, or the Army got to develop their own.
“Well, since you put it that way…”
The USAF adopted the A-7.
Since the F-111 was a compromise, and because early issues weren’t exactly shining a favorable light on the airplane, and regardless of the “F-for-fighter” designation, the F-111 could do one thing well—deliver ordnance on a target at low level and high speed, and because the air-to air-prowess of the Phantom wasn’t all it could be (even with the advent of the cannon armed F-4E), the USAF looked towards fielding a new fighter.
Experience in Vietnam dictated a dogfighter—a fast, maneuverable, light aircraft capable of yanking and banking with the best the bad guys could send. The program, called F-X (embodied as the McDonnell Douglas F-15), started with promise, but as the program progressed, mission creep set in. The airplane, initially proposed with no radar, gained a system that had “look down-shoot-down” capabilities that could guide the latest air-to-air missiles the USAF had—these changes were made due to the appearance of the Soviet MiG-25. More stuff in the airplane means the airplane weighs more. More weight needs (prompt Tim Taylor grunts) more power, so a second engine was installed. Another engine means more fuel. More fuel needs more airplane to carry it, which means more weight…
Like the Tomcat, there were no XF- or YF-15’s, the program going straight to the FSD stage with the initial airframes.
A small group of men (dubbed “The Fighter Mafia”), including USAF Major John Boyd, were upset at what F-X had become, and set upon making things right. Boyd was a Korean War F-86 pilot whose claim to fame came not on the battlefield but in the realm of energy management and aerodynamics. He developed the “Energy-Maneuverability” Theory (or E-M), and reasoned that a pure dogfighter needed to be very light, very maneuverable, and possess an excess of power. The Air Force brass—most of them, anyway—weren’t pleased. They saw this new design as a threat to F-X, since there were not funds for two programs.
However, a small number of Air Force officers and Pentagon officials were watching the price tag of F-X climb higher and higher, and realized that there was no economical way for the Air Force to completely equip with the type. They liked the idea of a “high-low mix”, where the force was mostly equipped by a smaller, lighter, and cheaper airplane, with fewer of the more expensive F-15. The resulting offshoot was initially called F-XX, later changed to the Lightweight Fighter (LWF) program.
The LWF program resulted in two designs—the General Dynamics YF-16 and the Northrop YF-17. After a fly-off, the YF-16 was declared the USAF’s lightweight fighter. Of course, by the time it reached squadron service, it was made larger, with a radar, and all sorts of ordnance carriage provisions—which made it also more expensive. So, that “high-low mix” became a “really high—sort of high” mix, but the airplane has been a global success.
The Navy was not unaffected. The F-4 needed to be replaced in the fleet, and the F-14 wasn’t getting any younger. Also looking for a high-low mix, the Navy evaluated the LWF contenders and chose the Northrop design, re-designated F-18, but only after it was “navalized”. McDonnell Douglas was chosen as the partner contractor to develop the fleet F-18 (as the F/A-18, for “Fighter/Attack”, since the airplane was intended to perform the Phantom’s air-to-ground duties with the USMC) while the modified YF-17 land-based derivative was Northrop’s to sell as the F-18L. Yeah, that deal didn’t work out too well. Northrop sued McAir when the latter sold the F/A-18 to landlocked countries instead of recommended the F-18L. In response, McAir sued Northrop for illegally using F/A-18 technology in their F-20 Tigershark (a single engine F-5 variant), and in the end, the cases were settled. Northrop would be cut out of the program and McDonnell Douglas would produce the F/A-18A/B/C/D and the derivative F/A-18E and F before they merged with Boeing in 1997.
One last knock-on effect of McNamara was the USAF requirement to acquire a new CAS airplane to replace the A-7. The USAF found that while the A-7D did well as a light attack airplane, it lacked survivability in the CAS mission. They wanted something more suited to slugging it out down in the weeds amidst enemy ground fire. The A-X program was set up and resulted in the Fairchild-Republic A-10A, a twin-engine, low wing airplane with a monster 30mm cannon in the nose that fired a round containing a depleted uranium (DU) spike, used for its density to punch holes in Soviet armor. And, true to form, the DoD resisted, even putting the A-10 through another fly-off against the A-7 to “prove” that the USAF *really* needed the new airplane. The A-10A wasn’t fast and sexy and, for a long time, it received no respect.
So, how have these weapons systems fared? Despite some of the difficulties McNamara caused, these aircraft have performed their duties admirably.
The F-111 eventually solved its teething problems. The F-111A, after a horrible debut in COMBAT LANCER, went back to Southeast Asia and performed admirably. The best performer of the family was the F-111F, with a better digital avionics system and more powerful and reliable TF30-P-100 engines. They would become a major force during Operation DESERT STORM.
In an interesting twist of fate, when the USAF went looking for an electronic warfare airplane, they decided to convert 40 or so F-111A’s to fill the role as the EF-111A. They partnered with Grumman based on two factors—Grumman was intimately familiar with the electronic warfare suite intended for the Raven (as the new variant was officially named, called “Spark Vark” by the troops), being similar to the versions installed on Grumman’s EA-6A and EA-6B; and Grumman’s experience on the F-111B. In this case, the program was a smooth as the TFX had been rocky for Grumman.
The F-111’s began to be retired in 1992 after Operation DESERT STORM, the final EF-111A retired in 1998. The RAAF finally retired their F-111C’s in 2010. Called “Aardvark” for most of its life, the name was officially bestowed upon the type on the day the F-111F was retired.
The F-14 Tomcat served as the Navy’s fleet defense aircraft from 1975 until it was retired in 2006. It was, without a doubt, one of the finest interceptors ever designed. Limited numbers are still in service in Iran, the only other nation to fly the type. They bought 80 (and received 79) in the late 1970’s before the fall of the Shah.
The F-15 Eagle is still in service with the USAF in multiple roles. Air Superiority, interceptor and low level interdiction (in the form of the F-15E Strike Eagle, replacing the remaining F-4’s and the F-111’s), it does the jobs well. The fighter variants are getting long in the tooth, and in an interesting twist, the latest F-15EX variants are forming the “low” portion of a “high-low mix” with the Lockheed F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter.
The F-16 Fighting Falcon (nobody calls them that, though—Viper seems to be the most common nickname) has become the backbone of the USAF’s fighter force, and is predicted to serve for another 20 years. It also has formed the nucleus of many allied air arms, replacing the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter in many of those air arms. The F-16 was license built in several NATO nations, and continues to serve around the world.
The F/A-18 Hornet, likewise, is still serving the Navy, Marine Corps, and several allies. The older A through D models (the “Legacy Hornets”) have been phased out of the fleet, and are being replaced with the F/A-18E and F/A-18F Super Hornet as a lower cost option to a navalized Lockheed F-22 Raptor. A specialized EW version, the EA-18G Growler, is taking the role of the long retired EA-6B in the fleet. The Marine Corps still operates the Legacy Hornets, but will replace them (and their McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harriers) with the F-35B V/STOL version of the JSF.
The A-7 Corsair II remained with the fleet until the last two squadrons were stood down in 1991, at the end of hostilities in DESERT STORM. The USAF sent their remaining active duty airplanes to the Air National Guard at the same time, and the ANG retired the type in 1993. The last active A-7’s served with the Hellenic Air Force in Greece, and were retired in 2014.
The A-10A Thunderbolt II (the troops call it “Warthog”, “Hawg” for short), the Rodney Dangerfield of the USAF, finally earned respect after DESERT STORM. On the verge of being retired in 1991, it was given a new lease on life. Another pending retirement in 2000, and again in 2014, have been averted, and the airplane has belatedly been given several avionics upgrades to continue to fight. A re-winging program recently concluded, and the A-10 may well serve another 15 to 20 years.
Some noise has been made about the F-35 replacing both the F-16 and the A-10. DESERT STORM proved the F-16 was a poor CAS airplane, and apparently the USAF brass has forgotten the lesson they learned when they had to swallow first the piston-engined A-1 and then the A-7 because their fast, pointy-nosed and sexy wonder airplanes couldn’t do the job. Ask any A-10 pilot, and they’ll tell you—only an A-10 can replace an A-10.
Speaking of the JSF, why don’t we take a look at that program as compared to TFX?
In short, the JSF, rather than being one airplane with many jobs, it became more of a family of closely related airframes—something that the F/A-18 and F-18L were envisioned to be. The land-based F-35A, the V/STOL F-35B, and ship-based F-35C look alike from a distance, but closer examination shows them to be different in key areas. Whether or not the program is a success remains to be seen, but any other comparisons to TFX would be misguided.
More than any other Secretary of Defense, McNamara loomed large for several decades after his retirement in 1968. Of course, he wasn’t the only SecDef to have their fingerprints on military programs that weren’t what they were advertised to be—several of his predecessors were in charge of programs like the advanced manned interceptor programs that resulted in the Convair F-102 and F-106, and McDonnell F-101B. Technology played a large role in these difficulties, and, like the Missileer and TFX, they depended on a lot of new technology not only working properly, but working together at the same time.
There are modern versions of this story, too—take a look at the Rockwell B-1B as but one of those stories. But those are different stories for another day.
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When I’m not researching or building models—I’m engaged in Phantoms #2 and #3 of a three-airplane project—I’m usually half-watching TV, since I have it on as background noise to aid my fight with tinnitus—it kills the ringing somewhat.
One of my favorite shows to watch is “Kids Baking Championship” on The Food Network (with re-runs on Cooking Channel).
Why?
For starters, these kids know far more about baking at 8, 10, or 12 years old than I do in my fifties. I started to find my way around a kitchen when I was 7 or 8 years old, including helping to bake the Christmas goodies. In all that time, I have never made sablée, macarons, or lemon curd, yet here these kids are, merrily whipping them up in the kitchen. I am amazed at their knowledge at such a young age.
Next, although it is a competition, it isn’t as cutthroat as some of the cooking shows are. Starting from an early episode, when one baker helped another, the kids genuinely care about each other. I don’t believe I’ve seen a season where one of the kids starts to break down after having trouble when another doesn’t step over to lend a hand. From some of the “Behind the Scenes” shows, these kids become fast friends.
Finally, there is one element that makes the show. Indeed, if it weren’t there, the show wouldn’t hold the same charm. I’m speaking, of course, about the hosts/judges, Duff Goldman (of Charm City Cakes) and Valerie Bertinelli (if I have to tell you who she is, you’ve got issues). They make the show what is is simply because of who they are—Valerie (aka "Wolfie's Mom") is the quintessential mom, and Duff is a 46-year old kid. Watching one episode recently, one of the kids starts to cry when things aren’t going how they should. Duff was there talking to the baker, trying to pep her up, and when she started crying he motioned for Val—“This is a Val moment, not a Duff moment”, he said. And he was right—she has a mother’s touch, and she handles those moments well.
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In other TV news, the NHL is back in action, and the IMSA season starts this weekend with the Roar Before the 24…
My beloved Florida Panthers had their first two games of the 2021 season postponed because their opponents, the Dallas Stars, had several members test positive for COVID-19. They got their season off to a belated start by beating the Chicago Blackhawks twice. I’ll have to get used to the 2021 Division realignment that moves Florida to the Central Division, but it ought to be fun. Of course, I miss the normal rivalries, but the fact that we even have hockey means I can live with the realignment.
In IMSA, my two favorite drivers are back in action after nearly a year on the sidelines. Katherine Legge, who broke her leg last year in an ELMS practice, has recovered from her injuries, and she and her Meyer Shank Racing and GEAR Racing co-driver, Christina Nielsen, have been tapped to co-drive the Hardpoint EBM Porsche 911 GT3 R alongside Earl Bamber and Rob Ferriol—and the team may add a second car for Katherine and Christina so they can run the rest of the season. Well done, ladies! Looking forward to much success!
While we're speaking of ladies in motorsport, Simona DeSilvestro has been named to drive the Paretta Racing car in the Indy 500, and Pippa Mann will drive in the WS Racing Girls Only Audi R8, and is heavily involved with Shift Up Now team.
Now, if only Pippa and Katherine could get an IndyCar ride for the 500...
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Oh, yeah—“The Blacklist” returns on Friday, too. They began the season last fall with a handful of episodes (probably the final episodes intended for last season before the pandemic shut production down), and now we’ll get to see to what ends Elizabeth goes in order to get back at Reddington after he killed her mother, Katarina. It took me a while to get into this show, but James Spader's creepy portrayal of Reddington is spot on and keeps things interesting.
Thanks for reading. Stay healthy, wear a mask, and be good to one another. As always, I bid you Peace.
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