Howdy, all! Today (28 March 2024, to be exact) is a rare day--I'm making multiple posts on the same day for your reading enjoyment. Sit back, relax, and enjoy...
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Today, let’s examine how the creation of the United States Air Force as a separate branch of the military created the military’s air power structure. This is a much larger brief than I had planned, but it answers a friend’s questions of “Why doesn’t the Army or Marines operate the A-10” and “How did the military air power structure get the way it is?”
Several names to remember—these acts of Congress, conferences, memorandums, and agreements shaped the United States’ post-WWII air power doctrine:
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The National Security Act of 1947
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The Key West Agreement of 1948
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The Pace-Finletter Memorandum of Understanding of 1952
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The Howze Board of 1961
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The Johnson-McConnell Agreement of 1966
It is a tangled tale, and if you really want to start at the start, it goes back to 1907.
The U. S. Army got into the aviation business during the Civil War, actually, but things began in earnest when the Aeronautical Division, U. S. Army Signal Corps was formed in 1907. The Aeronautical Division began acquiring aircraft in 1908, purchasing one nonrigid airship and one Wright Model A airplane from the Wright Brothers. The dirigible was delivered in July 1908, and the airplane came along in September. It was this airplane that also caused the first military fatality related to the new machines, when, on 17 September 1908, a propeller split, severed a guy wire, causing the airplane to crash. Killed in the crash was LT Thomas E. Selfridge, one of the early officers of the Division…
As the years went by, the Aeronautical Division would be replaced with the Air Division, which became the Aviation Section of the U. S. Signal Corps, which was in turn replaced by the U. S. Army Air Service in the World War I years. In 1926, the Army’s aviation group became the U. S. Army Air Corps, a title it would maintain until 1941, when it was changed to the U. S. Army Air Forces. The Air Corps still would exist in the army, relegated to battlefield observation and liaison duties, while the USAAF would handle the ever evolving concept of strategic and tactical air power.
Things got interesting. Since the early 1920’s, there had always been a faction of the USAAC/USAAF who believed that the service should be separate and independent from the Army. In 1947, the National Security Act did just that—in among many items that discussed intelligence gathering, a National Military Establishment, and security, President Truman ordered the creation of a United States Air Force as an independent branch of a revamped Department of Defense. In part, the duties were broadly outlined:
“In general, the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.”
At the same time, the U. S. Navy realized the importance of aviation, and began to develop their own organic air arm for the Fleet, as well as for the United States Marine Corps. Indeed, through the better part of two World Wars, the Navy’s investment in aviation paid off, much to the chagrin of long-time “Black-Shoe” officers. As aircraft became more capable, they would replace the big guns of the Navy’s battleships and cruisers. They became the eyes and ears of the Fleet, and they employed it quite effectively. The one drawback to post-war Navy aviation was that the early jets caused some issues. They were slow, thirsty, and early jet engines’ performance made them less than ideal from operations from a carrier deck.
At the end of the war, the United States possessed nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons of the day were large, and required large aircraft to deliver them—aircraft that were in the USAF inventory. Naval aircraft, operating off carrier decks, could not carry and deliver the nukes of the period. As a bit of a sop to the Navy, Truman promised the Navy that they could build their “supercarrier”, the USS United States (CVA-58), and allowed them to maintain an aviation wing of their own—for tactical, not strategic functions.
As the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions…
In March 1947, the service chiefs met in Key West, Florida to come up with specified duties for each branch of the United States armed forces. The documents that resulted from these meetings have been collectively called the “Key West Agreement of 1948”, formally Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The largest outcome of the meetings was an outline on how air assets would be deployed. The aforementioned Supercarrier and Naval Air Arm were indeed part of the discussion, but the largest discussion concerned the new USAF. Because they felt they were in the strategic airpower business, the USAF wanted to be the sole branch to conduct strategic aerial warfare. The truth be told, Curtis LeMay, USAF Chief of Staff, thought the USAF should be the sole service branch to operate any form of aircraft—or, as he put it, the Air Force should operate “everything that flies, right down the last puddle jumper.”
In the end, the Key West Agreement specified that the Navy (and by extension, the Marines) needed to have their own tactical (but not strategic) air power, and were permitted to develop the same. The Army was sort of left out in the cold in all these talks, and the aviation duties left within the Army structure at the time of the National Security Act were more or less kept as-is. The Air Force’s specific areas of operation were kept a bit vague at the time the Agreement was signed.
The papers, and the resulting memorandum, was sent to the Joint Chiefs in March 1948. A few months later, the Agreement was amended, and specific duties for the USAF were outlined:
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Gain/maintain air superiority
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Air defense of the United States
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Strategic air warfare
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Interdiction of enemy land power and communications
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Close combat and logistical air support
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Intelligence (including tactical intelligence) and aerial photography
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Airlift, air transport and resupply, and support for airborne and amphibious operations
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Interdict enemy sea power
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Antisubmarine warfare and shipping protection
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Aerial mine-laying
At the end of the day, the Army got to say their piece. The Agreement was said to bind the Armed Forces together into an “efficient team of land, naval, and air forces”. The USAF was to provide CAS, airlift, resupply, reconnaissance, and infrastructure interdiction. The Navy was given responsibility for developing and maintaining a tactical air arm. The Army could retain aviation assets for battlefield reconnaissance and medical evacuation (Medevac).
In 1948, this arrangement worked given the equipment then being fielded. However, time and technology stand still for no man…
In 1952, a memorandum of understanding was drafted and signed by then-Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter and then-Secretary of the Army Frank Pace. Called the Pace-Finletter Memorandum of Understanding, it accomplished two objectives.
The first objective was removing the gross weight capacity of the Army’s rotary wing aircraft. As helicopters developed and could carry more and do more than simple battlefield observation and short-distance medevac tasks, the Army would find ways to use them to their advantage. The Pace-Finletter MOU codified these changes, to a certain extent, by allowing the Army to operate larger helicopters to serve their combat needs.
At the same time, the MOU imposed a 5,000-lb. empty gross weight restriction on the Army’s fixed-wing assets. This limited the types of aircraft the Army could use, mostly directed at the liaison and administrative types in use.
This MOU also placed limits on what the USAF could do with their own helicopters. They could be used for airlift and medevac purposes to support combat operations using either fixed- OR rotary-wing aircraft.
It also stated the following:
“Army organic aviation will consist of aircraft primarily utilized by the Army within the Army combat zone as an integral part of its components for the purpose of expediting and improving ground combat and logistical procedures, subject, however, to the limitation that such aircraft will not duplicate the functions of the U.S. Air Force in providing the Army, by fixed-wing and rotary-wing type aircraft, close combat support, assault transport and other troop carrier airlift, aerial photography, tactical reconnaissance and interdiction of enemy land power and communications.”
But wait, there’s more!
By the early 1960’s, the Army (and, to some extent, the Marines) were developing what would become known as the Airmobile concept. One of the tenets of this new way of thinking was that the Army would use specialized helicopters to provide organic Close Air Support to their troops in the field. The war in Southeast Asia was beginning to create a lot of friction between the Army and Air Force. The Air Force pointed to the Key West Agreement and the Pace-Finletter MOU and bluntly told the Army to:
A. Stop using armed helicopters for CAS
B. Stop arming the new Grumman OV-1 Mohawk Battlefield Surveillance airplane
C. Terminate the AC-1 Caribou program.
As discussed, LeMay firmly believed that the USAF should be the only service branch to operate any type of aircraft. And, to LeMay, that meant strategic air warfare doctrine developed around the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. However, the Key West Agreement and Pace-Finletter MOU challenged that notion.
Enter the Howze Board. And enter more fuel to the fire.
The Howze Board was convened at the behest of Secretary of Defense McNamara to discuss a working plan for integrating helicopters into a coherent unit. It also wanted to explore the use of helicopters as Close Air Support aircraft, something the Air Force was vehemently against. After all, one of the tenets of both the Key West Agreement and the Pace-Finletter MOU was establishing the USAF’s responsibility for fielding CAS assets, and the stipulation that the Army should not develop aircraft in parallel to the Air Force for the same mission.
Tangent: For those who want to point at the USMC’s use of their own CAS (from the use of F4U Corsairs in Korea to AV-8B Harriers in modern times), recall that the Key West Agreement allowed the Navy and Marines to develop and field “tactical” aviation assets. Loophole? Yeah. But the fact that the Air Force was split off from the Army as a separate, mature force was much different than the way the Marines were always a paired service with the Navy, and developed their own air arms together.
The result of the Howze Board was the formation of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) in 1963 at Fort Benning, Georgia. The subordinate units of the 11th Air Assault Division planned and tested various concepts until they found a workable formula. In 1965, the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) was merged with the 10th Air Transport Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Division. The Division was then inactivated and the personnel and materiel were assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). They were sent to Vietnam in July, 1965, and began to prove the Airmobile concept to the Army leadership. The Army was satisfied that organic Army units could indeed carry out any mission that the situation called for.
This is where what would be “another story for another time” needs to be told now. The AC-1 (later CV-2) Caribou was a deHavilland Canada cargo airplane designed at the request of the U. S. Army capable of short field operations. The Army saw these aircraft as ideal for carrying troops and cargo into the battlefield. The Air Force, however, insisted that the Fairchild C-123 could carry more for a longer distance. What rankled the USAF was that, with the acquisition of the Caribou and the OV-1, the Army was building an organic tactical air arm.
Incidentally, the Caribou proved to be a better aircraft in theater, but the USAF was still not happy. So…
In 1966, Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson and USAF Chief of Staff John P. McConnell came to an agreement, called the Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966. The result: The Army agreed to give up the Caribou, which were transferred to the USAF in 1967 under Operation RED LEAF and re-designated as C-7. The agreement stated that the USAF was required to maintain the C-7 and were required to confer with the Army before replacing or retiring the type.
The Army was allowed to retain the OV-1. They continued to arm them, much to the chagrin of the USAF.
At the same time, this agreement made the USAF relinquish all rotary wing aircraft used for intra-theater transport and other Army-related missions. This was specifically aimed at the USAF use of the Sikorsky CH-3A as transports. The USAF’s use of these aircraft were to be limited to Special Air Warfare and Search and Rescue use.
And the Air Force adopted the Navy's Vought A-7 (as the A-7D) for the close air support mission. After evaluating that aircraft's combat performance in the skies over Vietnam, they began the A-X program, which resulted in the selection of the Fairchild-Republic A-10 as the USAF's next CAS aircraft. It boggles the mind that the final example of the 715 A-10's built left Fairchild's Hagerstown, Maryland facility in 1984--40 years ago. The venerable Hawg, the airplane the generals didn't want (until it proved itself, then they only wanted it when it was convenient because it wasn't a sexy, pointy-nosed, speed demon of an airplane) is now in the twilight of its career, sadly, but as I've said before, technology and time stand still for no man...
When the Army developed the Hughes Helicopters AH-64 Apache beginning in the early 1970's (to replace the Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne cancelled in part to free up funding for the A-10 and AV-8 Harrier), there was some growling from the Air Force, but by then the Army was going to do what was good for the Army, Air Force arguments and the patchwork of inter-service agreements and memorandums be damned.
So, here we are. What did we learn? Intra-service rivalries are not exactly a good thing…even though the various agreements specified no overlap of assets, this is what happens. It is expensive. But is there an alternative?
In one of those “chew the rag” sessions at the hobby shop, a discussion about the various military forces around the globe started. One thing led to another, and the conversation shifted to something along the lines of, “What would happen in the U.S. if the individual branches of the military were combined into a unified force (such as the unified armed forces of Canada)?"
But that truly is another story for another time.
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Sorry to be so long, but it is a story that few people even know about. And again, if I got some of the details not quite correct, let me know.
Thanks for reading. As always, be good to one another, and I bid you Peace.
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